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ABSTRACT
The intensity of exploitation of natural resources has increased over 
the past decades, making environmental protection policy one of the 
most important priorities of government institutions. Various economic 
instruments, including taxation, may help policy makers in the EU meet 
environmental targets, among them a more secure and competitive 
green economy in Europe. The focus of this paper is on empirically 
investigating the direct effect of environmental taxes and the indirect 
effect of environmental expenditures sourced from environmental taxes 
on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the energy sector. The research 
applied the panel data analysis method to selected EU member states 
for the 1995–2010 period. The results show that the direct effect of 
environmental taxes on GHG emissions in the sector energy is statistically 
significant and negative. The indirect effects of environmental taxes 
resulting from environmental expenditures in the industrial and 
governmental sectors were found to be even stronger than the direct 
effect of taxes alone.
Keywords: government policy, air pollution, climate, environmental taxation
JEL: Q28, Q53, Q54, H23
1 Introduction
Climate change poses a wide range of risks to mankind and all living things 
on Earth. Since total anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have 
increased continuously from the 1970s to 2010, policy-makers are striving 
to find the most optimal solution to limit the effects of climate change. 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change alleges that the combustion 
of fossil fuels for energy constitutes one of the leading sources of GHG 
emissions. Therefore it is not surprising that the energy sector represents one 
of the main fields of environmental taxation as a tool for dealing with global 
warming.
The purpose of this article is to assess whether environmental taxes 
significantly contribute to the mitigation of the greenhouse gas effect, 
expressed in CO2-equivalents, in the energy sector. A number of similar 
efforts to address and improve (environmental) taxation and governmental 
performance have taken shape over the last decade (e.g. Ayala, Pedraja, & 
Salinas-Jimnez, 2008; Dečman, Stare, & Klun, 2010; Morley, 2012; Kotnik, 
Klun, & Škulj, 2014). The effects of environmental taxes are divided into direct 
effects (degree of taxes collected) and indirect effects (public expenditures 
for environmental purposes sourced from environmental taxes). In this 
respect, the article provides deeper insight into the theme of environmental 
taxes.
The main results of the analysis generally confirm that environmental taxes 
directly and indirectly have a significant negative impact on GHG emissions in 
the energy sector. The indirect effects of environmental taxes resulting from 
environmental expenditures were found to be even stronger than the direct 
effect of taxes alone. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
section two presents a review of literature on the role of economic instruments 
with a special focus on environmental taxes, and section three describes the 
data and methodology used for testing the effect of environmental taxes and 
expenditures on GHG emissions in the energy sector. The empirical results are 
then examined. In the final part, conclusions and some practical policy advice 
are presented.
2 Literature Review
The intensity of the exploitation of natural resources has increased over 
the past decades, making environmental protection policy a top priority of 
governmental institutions. In this framework, all European Union (EU) member 
states currently apply a variety of economic instruments (environmental taxes, 
fees and charges, tradable permits, deposit-refund system, subsidies, etc.) to 
implement the targets stipulated in EU environmental policy (Kurtinaitytė-
Venediktovienė, Pereira, & Černiauskas, 2014, p. 332).
Various economic instruments, including taxation, may help policy makers 
to meet environmental targets in the EU, one of which being a more secure 
and competitive green economy in Europe. The EU is the world leader in the 
projection, admission and implementation of strict environmental policies 
(Costantini & Mazzanti, 2012). As the main objective of environmental 
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tax reform (ETR)1 is to reduce labour and investment taxation and to raise 
revenues by taxing pollution, ETR should generate higher rates of economic 
growth. This policy is often regarded as producing a double dividend (DD), 
in that the environment is improved while the economy benefits through 
reductions in distortionary taxes (Bosquet, 2000). The first dividend is the 
environmental goal and entails the reduction of carbon emissions, i.e. 
introducing carbon and energy taxes (such as taxes on resource use or cuts 
to environmentally harmful subsidies) in order to reduce the use of fuels that 
produce carbon dioxide. The second dividend mainly refers to reductions in 
social security contributions and other forms of taxation directly related to 
the cost of labour. The positive side of the DD in the context of ETR has been 
pointed out by authors such as Oates, 1995 and Pearce, 1991. Regardless of 
the positive effects of the DD, some studies (Goulder, 1995; Parry & Oates, 
1998; Eissa, Blundell, & Blow, 2000) have shown that these effects depend on 
pre-existing tax levels.
An environmental tax is a tax whose base is a physical unit (or a proxy of a 
physical unit) of something that has a proven, specific negative impact on the 
environment (Eurostat, 2015). The primary purpose of environmental taxes 
is to reduce pollution through the “polluter pays” principle. Most studies 
(Bosquet, 2000; Do Valle, Pintassilgo, Matias, & André, 2012) that have dealt 
with assessments of the impact of environmental taxes and ETR have shown 
that these taxes have a positive impact on the environment.
Although the literature does not uniformly accept the notion of the DD and 
its implied positive impact on the economy, the interdependence between 
reductions in public funding and taxes on pollution cannot be refuted. For 
this reason, some authors (Brett & Keen, 2000; Haibara, 2009; Do Valle et al., 
2012) have shown that revenues from environmental taxes are often used to 
finance specific spending programs and that they provide an additional source 
of revenue for state and local budgets, which means that environmental taxes 
are used for purposes other than to minimize the effects of distortionary 
taxes.
Studies such as López, Vinod and Wang (2008), López, Galinato and Islam (2011) 
and López and Galinato (2007) have analysed the link between environmental 
taxes and GHG emissions. They concluded that directing government 
spending toward social and public goods, including the mitigation of climate 
change, leads to a significant reduction in the environmental burden. Higher 
public expenditure for environmental protection therefore reduces levels of 
greenhouse gases and other harmful emissions. In their work, Pezzey and Park 
(1998) showed that increasing taxes on energy or introducing these taxes in 
1 According to the EEA (2005) environmental tax reform (ETR) refers to “changes in the national 
tax system where the burden of taxes shifts from economic functions, sometimes called 
‘goods’, such as labour (personal income tax), capital (corporate income tax) and consumption 
(VAT and other indirect taxes), to activities that lead to environmental pressures and natural 
resource use, sometimes called ‘bads’”.
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a country’s tax system helps reduce CO2 and SO2 and enhance the quality of 
air, water and soil and the environment in general.
3 Data Description and Methodology
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 17 EU countries. The sample size 
reflects the fact that limited data is available for environmental indicators. The 
sample includes Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, 
Hungary, Romania, Spain, France, Italia, Malta, Portugal, Netherlands, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. The criterion for the selection of countries 
was the availability of data on the direct and indirect effects of environmental 
taxes and data on GHG emissions in the energy sector.
Studies by Baltagi (2013) and Wooldridge (2003) form the basis for the 
methodologies used in the research. These authors suggest joining cross 
sectional data and time series in a panel. The model was used to investigate 
the direct effect of environmental taxes on GHG emissions in the energy 
sector and the indirect effect of environmental taxes on GHG emissions in the 
energy sector as a result of environmental expenditures on GHG emissions. 
Environmental taxes and expenditures were expected to result in a reduction 
in GHG emissions. The question was therefore the magnitude of the effect of 
each component.
Equation 1 represents the direct effect of a change in environmental taxes 
on changes in GHG emissions in the energy sector and the indirect effect of 
environmental taxes on changes in GHG emissions in the energy sector as a 
result of changes in environmental expenditures.
∆𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 +�𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗∆𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘) + � 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧(𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚)1𝐿𝐿+𝑀𝑀
𝑘𝑘=𝐿𝐿+1
𝐿𝐿
𝑗𝑗=1 +�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗∆𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙) + 𝑢𝑢1𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1  (1) 
I CO2 (equivalent) emissions in the energy sector
ΔIt = It – I(t–1) First difference between CO2 (equivalent) emissions in the 
energy sector (I) in two consecutive years
E Environmental expenditures (N categories)
ΔEt = Et – E(t–1) First difference between environmental expenditures (E) in 
two consecutive years
T Direct effect of environmental taxes (L categories)
ΔTt = Tt – T(t–1) First difference between direct effects of environmental 
taxes (T) in two consecutive years
j Counter by category (direct effect of environmental taxes, 
environmental expenditures)
t Time period (1995–2010)
k, l, m Time lags
α, β Coefficients (parameters to be estimated)
zt1 Control variables
u1 Idiosyncratic structural errors
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First, differences in the dependent and explanatory variables were used to 
observe the impact of changes in the explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable and to eliminate fixed effects. In line with best practices from 
other studies (Morley, 2012; López et al., 2011; Bernauer & Koubi, 2006), 
control variables (government expenditure on public goods, GDP per square 
kilometre, etc.) were also used in the model. Standard OLS regression was 
performed and potential heteroscedasticity (due to the panel data) was 
checked; robust regression analysis was also performed to ensure the results 
were not excessively influenced by outliers. Time lags and first differences in 
the explanatory variables were used in Equation 1, and a Hausman test was 
performed to check for potential endogeneity.
The empirical model may be written in the following way:
ΔENERGY=α + β1ΔTAX + β2ΔEXPI + β3ΔEXPG + β4ΔGDP + β5ΔTGE + 
β6ΔGPG + u
(2) 
where ENERGY is a yearly change in CO2 (equivalent) emissions in the energy 
sector (tonnes of CO2 equivalent per 1,000,000€ GDP), TAX is a yearly change 
in energy taxes, including fuel for transport (€ per 1,000€ GDP), EXPI is a yearly 
change in environmental expenditure for the reduction of GHG emissions in the 
industrial sector (€ per 1,000€ GDP), EXPG is a yearly change in environmental 
expenditure for the reduction of GHG emissions in the governmental sector 
(€ per 1000€ GDP), GDP is a yearly change in GDP per square kilometre, TGE 
is a yearly change in total general government expenditures (in millions of 
€ per 1,000,000€ GDP), GPG is a yearly change in government expenditure 
on public goods (as a % of total government expenditure), and u is the error 
term. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented 
in Table 1.
4 Empirical Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variables Median Mean Standard deviation N
ENERGY –17.74 –45.56 208.32 255
TAX –0.33 –0.08 2.26 221
EXPI 0.00 0.04 1.05 221
EXPG 0.00 0.00 0.36 238
GDP 1.89 3.65 4.43 272
TGE 4.66 4.64 0.66 255
GPG 1.70 1.76 0.41 255
Number of obs =221
Source: Eurostat (2014), authors
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Table 2:  Correlations
ENERGY TAX EXPI EXPG GDP TGE GPG
ENERGY 1.00
TAX –0.28 1.00
EXPI –0.23 0.00 1.00
EXPG –0.17 –0.02 0.06 1.00
GDP 0.27 0.01 –0.03 0.00 1.00
TGE 0.41 –0.03 –0.05 –0.04 0.02 1.00
GPG –0.35 –0.03 0.06 0.08 –0.07 –0.45 1.00
Number of obs =221
Source: authors
Table 2 presents correlations among the used variables. No obvious multi-
collinearity is present because correlations between variables do not show 
extreme values. Table 3 presents the variance inflation factor (VIF) and 
tolerance values, which are within the accepted boundaries.
Table 3:  Variance inflation factor and tolerance
Variable VIF Tolerance
GPG 1.27 0.789393
TGE 1.25 0.797646
EXPG 1.01 0.989834
EXPI 1.01 0.991412
GDP 1.01 0.993736
VIF mean 1.09
Number of obs =221
Source: authors
Table 4 shows empirical estimates for a standard OLS regression, a regression 
with robust standard errors (corrected for heteroscedasticity) and robust 
regression estimates (taking into account outliers). All coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1% level and have the expected sign (a negative 
sign means a favourable effect on the change in CO2 (equivalent) emissions in 
the energy sector). The empirical results closely match those reported in the 
literature ( e.g. Bernauer & Koubi, 2006; Do Valle et al., 2012; Brett & Kenn, 
2000). Higher environmental taxes translate into a reduction in GHG emissions 
in the energy sector, while higher total general government expenditures 
tend to increase GHG emissions in the energy sector.
The paper focuses on the direct and indirect effects of environmental taxes. 
The direct effect of environmental energy taxes on CO2 (equivalent) emissions 
in the sector energy was shown to be negative and quite strong (–9.33***) 
both quantitatively and statistically. The sign and statistical significance of 
the coefficient do not change across different methods of estimation. The 
size of the coefficient does drop to –1.81** in the Huber regression, but 
even here it remains negative and statistically significant. This means that 
an increase in the direct effect of environmental taxes tends to contribute 
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to the reduction of GHG emissions in the energy sector. This finding is 
consistent with the results of studies that have shown that environmental 
taxes have an impact on the reduction of GHG emissions and other emissions 
(Halkos & Epameinondas, 2013; Corbacho, Fretes Cibils, & Eduardo, 2013; 
López & Galinato, 2007). The direct effect of environmental taxes can be 
observed through the use of different fiscal and economic instruments in 
EU countries, e.g. taxes, environmental deposits, tax allowances and (in)
direct subsidies. These instruments, and especially the last two, are generally 
more stimulative than taxation alone because industrial polluters invest 
in green technologies in order to obtain subsidies and partly avoid paying 
environmental taxes.
Table 4:  Estimates of GHG emissions in the energy sector
Variable Coeff. OLS Robust OLS Huber robust regression
TAX β1
–9.33*** 
(1.74)
–9.33*** 
(2.74)
–1.81** 
(0.87)
EXPI β2
–12.93*** 
(3.74)
–12.93** 
(6.08)
–3.86** 
(1.87)
EXPG β3
–27.76** 
(10.72)
–27.76 
*(15.31)
–10.76** 
(5.38)
GDP β4
4.00*** 
(0.84)
4.00*** 
(0.70)
0.93** 
(0.42)
TGE β5
35.28*** 
(7.11)
35.28 
***(7.64)
18.75*** 
(3.56)
GPG β6
–32.45*** 
(10.49)
–32.45 
***(12.44)
15.66*** 
(5.26)
Const. α -162.71***  (44.59)
–162.71*** 
(50.14)
–137.86*** 
(22.37)
N 221 221 221 221
Results of OLS, robust OLS and Huber robust regression are shown.
The yearly difference in CO2 (equivalent) emissions from energy sectors (energy) is a dependent 
variable. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote statistically significant values at 1, 
5 and 10% respectively in a two-tailed test.
Source: Eurostat (2014) and authors
The results also reveal indirect effects of environmental taxes on GHG 
emissions in the energy sector resulting from environmental expenditure 
in the industrial sector (–12.93***) and governmental sector (–27.76**). 
This suggests that public appropriations for activities for the elimination, 
prevention or reduction of CO2 (equivalent) emissions are also very important 
in reducing the effects of global warming. The overall properties of the 
regression equation are quite good, with an adjusted R-square of 0.38.
Apart from explanatory variables, the model includes several control 
variables. Most environmental economics studies (e.g. Antweiler, Copeland, 
& Taylor, 2001; Bernauer & Koubi, 2006; Kotnik et al., 2014; Morley, 2012) 
include variables that measure the economic activity of a country. The 
coefficients of the GDP per square kilometre and total general government 
expenditure variables in the model show a positive and statistically significant 
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effect on GHG emissions in the energy sector at 1%. Higher levels of 
economic activity suggest higher GHG emission levels in the energy sector. 
This is consistent with the evidence presented by Antweiler et al. (2001) and 
Carlsson and Lundström (2001), who found that the government size and 
economic activity of a country have a positive effect on CO2 and other air 
emissions. Similarly, Bernauer and Koubi (2006) suggest that an increase in 
governmental spending, as an indicator of higher levels of economic activity, 
leads to more pollution. Halkos and Epameinondas (2013) proved that higher 
levels of government spending result in higher levels of ambient emissions, 
and Bernauer and Koubi (2006) showed that more government spending 
goes hand in hand with more GHG and other emissions. An expansion in the 
size of government is likely to result explicitly in the improved welfare of 
society as a whole when this expansion is demand-driven (citizen-over-state) 
and when it aims at the provision of a pure public good or the correction of an 
externality. This evidence (coefficients of the GDP variables) could contradict 
Environmental Kuznets Curve theory. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
hypothesis predicts an inverse U-shaped relationship between per capita 
income and certain types of pollution (Asghari, 2012). At the initial stages 
of industrialization, growth leads to increased water and air pollution; later, 
pollution can decrease if the right institutions are in place because as they 
become rich, countries can afford to pay to clean up the environment. EKC 
theory predicts that the coefficient on the squared income term is negative, 
so the pollution curve ultimately turns down. However, some authors (e.g. 
Frankel & Rose, 2005) have argued that CO2 is a global pollutant and as such 
is not applicable to the EKC.2 This is also confirmed by the empirical results 
of this research, which could be viewed as further evidence in support of the 
so-called free-rider problem: countries are not willing to reduce emissions on 
their own for fear of becoming less competitive.
The empirical results also show a statistically significant and negative effect 
for the government expenditure on public goods variable (–32.45***). 
Government expenditure on public goods is spending for research and 
development, education, health, etc. In comparison with expenditures on 
private goods, expenditures on public goods could alleviate the effects 
of market failure and complement, rather than substitute, private-sector 
spending. Thus the reallocation of government spending from private (that 
is, environmentally-intensive) to public goods could give priority to human-
intensive activities. The latter have a relatively smaller environmental 
footprint, which explains the negative sign of the GPG variable.
Table 5 reveals some minor differences between the fixed and random effects 
models. This could be due to the omission of time and country variables. A 
Hausman test was used to check the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
Since the hypothesis was not confirmed, there is a strong probability that 
2 Authors investigating EKC in relation to air pollutants (SO2, particular matter (PM10), NO2) 
have gotten supportive (e.g. Frankel, 2003) or mixed results (e.g. Bradford, Schlieckert, & 
Shore, 2000).
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endogeneity is not present in the model and that coefficients of interests 
are not correlated with unobserved variability. The results from the random 
effects model and robustness estimates reported above, and especially those 
from the Huber regression estimates, indicate that the model is fairly robust. 
The direct and indirect effects of environmental taxes on CO2 (equivalents) 
emissions in the energy sector are therefore confirmed.
Table 5:  Estimates of CO2 (equivalent) emissions in industrial processes: fixed 
effects, random effects and Hausman test
Variable Fixed Effects Random Effects
TAX –9.43*** (1.63)
–8.81*** 
(1.62)
EXPI –11.07*** (3.36)
–11.74*** 
(3.45)
EXPG –22.78** (9.73)
–25.99** 
(9.91)
GDP 3.76 (3.84)
3.90*** 
(1.27)
TGE 70.02*** (17.27)
37.26*** 
** (9.24)
GPG –81.47*** (19.09)
–42.48*** 
*(12.72)
Const. –234.76*** (75.09)
–153.69*** 
(53.44)
N 221 221
Hausman test 0.4259
Results from fixed effects model, random effects model and Hausman test are shown. 
Yearly difference in CO2 (equivalent) emissions in the energy sector (energy) is a dependent 
variable.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote statistically significant values at 1, 
5 and 10 % respectively in a two-tailed test. 
Source: Eurostat (2014) and authors
5 Conclusion
The results of the analysis suggest that the use of environmental taxes in the 
European Union has had a statistically significant and negative effect on GHG 
emissions in the energy sector. This was confirmed by OLS, robust OLS and a 
Huber regression. Comparison of the fixed and random effects models did 
not reveal considerable differences. Indirect effects of environmental taxes 
resulting from environmental expenditures in the industrial and governmental 
sectors were found to be even stronger than the direct effect of taxes alone. 
This suggests that direct funding of environmental protection activities aimed 
specifically at the prevention, reduction and elimination of GHG emissions has 
a more favourable environmental impact than direct taxation, even though 
the latter also tends to reduce GHG emissions.
Some policy guidelines may be derived from the results. The findings provide 
broader insight into evaluations of environmental policy measures and could 
assist in the search for the optimal equilibrium between the direct and indirect 
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effects of environmental taxation when articulating economic instruments 
for environmental protection with the aim of mitigating the effects of 
climate change. This may help to design effective public appropriations 
and maximize environmental impacts. The methodology used here may be 
applied to related sectors such as water and soil pollution, or more broadly to 
fields like education or health. A prerequisite for the analysis is the existence 
of adequate input-output data. Opportunities for further research are in 
widening the dataset to include non-EU member states and deepening the 
dataset with regional data as such data becomes available in the future.
The results also provide support for studies which suggest that the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is not valid for GHG emissions. On the 
contrary, there is evidence in support of the free-rider problem, because CO2 
(equivalents) are global externalities and there is no reason for individual 
countries to take action on their own without a mechanism for international 
cooperation.
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POVZETEK
1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek
Okoljski davki: novi dokazi za davke na energijo
V zadnjih desetletjih se je intenzivnost izkoriščanja naravnih virov 
močno povečala. Zaradi tega je politika varstvo okolja postavila kot eno 
najpomembnejših prednostnih nalog vladnih institucij. Različni ekonomski 
instrumenti, skupaj z obdavčenjem, lahko pomagajo oblikovalcem politik v 
Evropski uniji pri izpolnjevanju okoljskih ciljev, med drugim k bolj varnemu in 
konkurenčnemu zelenemu gospodarstvu v Evropi.
Okoljski davki so ekonomski instrumenti varovanja okolja, katerih glavni 
namen je spodbujanje zmanjševanja obremenitev okolja z uporabo načela 
»povzročitelj plača«, po katerem se stroški, nastali s škodo, povzročeno okolju, 
vsaj delno vključujejo med proizvodne stroške. Večina zbranih prihodkov 
okoljskih davkov je vir državnega proračuna, del pa je prihodek občinskih 
proračunov in je namenjen financiranju lokalnih programov varstva okolja. 
Namen okoljskih davkov je, da onesnaževalec plača »ceno« za vsako tono 
emisij. Če onesnaževalec zmanjša izpuste emisij, je nagrajen z nižjim plačilom 
davka.
Izdatki za varstvo okolja so odraz prizadevanja za preprečevanje 
onesnaževanja, ki nastane s proizvodnjo blaga in storitev. Izdatki za varstvo 
okolja so opredeljeni kot znesek denarja, ki je porabljen za vse dejavnosti 
preprečevanja onesnaževanja. Ti podatki zajemajo naslednje gospodarske 
dejavnosti: investicije za varstvo okolja, tekoče izdatke za varstvo okolja ter 
subvencije, izdane za okoljevarstvene dejavnosti.
Emisije toplogrednih plinov (TPG) so okoljski kazalniki za področje varstva zraka 
in podnebja. Različni toplogredni plini so vrednoteni po njihovem potencialu 
za globalno segrevanje, zato so končne emisije izražene v ekvivalentih CO2. 
Med toplogredne pline štejemo ogljikov dioksid (CO2), metan (CH4), dušikov 
oksid (N2O), perfluorirane ogljikovodike (PFC), fluorirane ogljikovodike 
(HFC) in žveplov heksafluorid (SF6). Popis toplogrednih plinov Eurostata je v 
celoti skladen z nacionalnimi registri toplogrednih plinov, ki jih pripravljajo v 
državah članicah EU. Emisije toplogrednih plinov (CO2 ekvivalente) merimo v 
naslednjih sektorjih: energija, industrijski procesi, kmetijstvo, uporaba topil in 
drugih izdelkov ter v sektorju odpadki.
Namen članka je empirična analiza vpliva neposrednih okoljskih davkov 
in posrednega vpliva okoljskih davkov prek okoljskih izdatkov na emisije 
toplogrednih plinov (TGP) v energetskem sektorju. V raziskavi so bili 
uporabljeni panelni podatki časovnih vrst izbranih držav članic EU za časovno 
obdobje 1995–2010.
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Rezultati analize kažejo, da je neposreden vpliv okoljskih davkov na emisije 
toplogrednih plinov v energetskem sektorju statistično značilen in vpliva 
na zmanjševanje toplogrednih plinov v izbranem sektorju. Posredni vpliv 
okoljskih davkov prek okoljskih izdatkov v industrijskem sektorju in sektorju 
država je celo močnejši od neposrednega učinka okoljskih davkov, njihov 
učinek je prav tako negativen. To pomeni, da ima neposredno financiranje 
okoljevarstvenih dejavnosti, ki so namenjene posebej za preprečevanje, 
zmanjšanje in odpravo emisij toplogrednih plinov, bolj ugoden vpliv na okolje 
kot sama neposredna obdavčitev, čeprav slednja prav tako pripomore k 
zmanjševanju emisij toplogrednih plinov. Rezultati so bili ocenjeni z metodo 
najmanjših kvadratov (OLS), robustno metodo najmanjših kvadratov in 
Huber regresijo. Primerjava modelov s fiksnimi in slučajnimi učinki prav 
tako ni razkrila prisotnosti bistvenih statističnih razlik v modelih, kar kaže na 
odsotnost endogenosti v modelih. To pomeni, da že osnovni model ustrezno 
kontrolira tako fiksne vplive kot časovne vplive, zaradi tega modela s fiksnimi 
in slučajnimi vplivi ne dajeta značilno boljših rezultatov.
Iz empiričnih rezultatov lahko izpeljemo nekatere smernice za okoljsko 
politiko. Ugotovitve raziskave zagotavljajo širši vpogled v vrednotenje ukrepov 
okoljske politike in bi lahko pomagale pri iskanju optimalnega ravnovesja med 
neposrednim in posrednim vplivom okoljskega obdavčenja pri opredelitvi 
ekonomskih instrumentov za varstvo okolja z namenom ublažitve posledic 
podnebnih sprememb. Razvita metodologija se lahko uporablja v sorodnih 
sektorjih, kot sta onesnaževanje voda in tal ter sektor odpadki, ali bolj na 
splošno na področjih, kot sta izobraževanje in zdravstvo. Osnovni pogoj za 
analizo je obstoj ustreznih vhodno-izhodnih podatkov. Priložnosti za nadaljnje 
raziskave so v razširitvi nabora podatkov, vključitvi držav, ki niso članice EU, 
ter razširitvi nabora podatkov z regionalnimi okoljskimi podatki, ko bodo v 
prihodnosti slednji na voljo.
Rezultati analize kažejo tudi podporo študijam, ki zagovarjajo, da okoljska 
Kuznetsova krivulja (EKC) ne velja za emisije toplogrednih plinov (CO2 
ekvivalente). Nasprotno, obstajajo dokazi v podporo problema »free riderstva« 
(zastonjkarje), ker so emisije toplogrednih plinov globalne eksternalije in za 
posamezne države ni pravega razloga, da bi ukrepale same, brez ustreznega 
mehanizma mednarodnega sodelovanja.
